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FRAUD ON SPECIAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT'
Aios H. EBLEN*
If one makes a will leaving his property to his wife for life
and after her death as she shall appoint by her will, to the exclu-
sion of one or any, he has avoided many of the disadvantages
of a gift of the property to the wife absolutely, or of a life
estate in the wife with a remainder to the children. This special
testamentary power 2 of appointment secures a deferred division
* A. B., LL. B., University of Missouri (1931); S. J. D., Harvard
Law School (1934); Professor of Law, University of Kentucky Col-
lege of Law.
'A power of appointment is an authority to make a gift of an-
other's interest in property. The creator of the authority is called the
donor and the one to whom the authority is given is the donee. Where
the same person is donor and donee, as where an owner of property
conveys to trustees in trust for others, reserving a power to alter or
revoke, the power is called a power of revocation. It differs from a
power of appointment only in that the same person is donor and
donee. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 60 L. Ed. 30
(1916); in re Goldwitz's Will, 145 Misc. R. 300, 259 N. Y. Supp. 900
(1932). Powers of appointment are to be distinguished from powers
og sale, lease, exchange, etc. The authority that is created in this
latter type of cases is so limited in scope that they present but few of
the problems that arise in connection with powers of appointment. See
Leach., Powers of Sale in Trustees ana the Rule Against Perpetitities
(1934), 47 Har'. L. Rev. 948.
2 The two important classifications of powers of appointment are
with reference to possible appointees and the method of execution.
These two factors are the best (most times the only) indicators of the
intention of the donor. Under the first classification are general and
special powers; under the second, deed and testamentary powers. If
the donee, at the time when the power is first exercisable may appoint
to anyone, the power is general. Greenway v. White, 196 Ky. 745, 246
S. W. 147 (1922). For the statutory classification in New York see
N. Y. Real Prop. Law (1909) c. 51, Secs. 134, 135. Gray combined the
matters of appointees and manner of execution by defining a general
power as a power to appoint to anyone, including the donee. Gray,
Release anti Discharge of Powers (1911), 24 Harv. L. Rev. 511. Kales
agreed. Kales, Estates Future Interest (2d ed. 1920) Sec. 609. If at
the time when the power is first exercisable the donee may only ap-
point to the members of a class or group, the power is special. The
donee may be a member of that class. Wetmore v. Henry, 259 Ill. 80,
102 N. 1. 189 (1913); Taylor v. Allhusen (1905) 1 Ch. 529. If the
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of the property among the children according to the unforesee-
able circumstances of the later time. This is a distinct advan-
tage where the children are infants. The possible beneficiaries
are limited just the same as in the case of the life estate with
a remainder. At the same time the share of each is to depend
upon the decision of the donee. This fosters the parental con-
trol of the surviving spouse. Equally important is the fact
that the property is exempt from the debts of the donee.
As against these advantages there is one possible and one
partial disadvantage. Since the power is testamentary the
donee is prevented from making any appointment which will be
effeetive prior to his death, except as the power may be released.3
It is possible that there may be a real necessity for a gift to
some of the children prior to the death of the donee. Also to
a certain extent the success of the device depends upon the trust-
worthiness of the one who is to act as appointor. He may
attempt to appoint to one not an object of the power; he may
appoint to an object but for the purpose of benefiting one not
a member of the class of objects; he may attempt to attach some
collateral condition to an appointment to one of the members;
and he may divide the property among the class according to
his likes and dislikes and not according to to the needs of each.
It is the purpose of this discussion to make an examination
of the extent to which the courts will go in exercising a control
over the conduct of the donee in the last three types of appoint-
ments mentioned.
power is exercisable only by will it is a testamentary power. If it may
be exercised by deed or by deed or will it is a deed power.
It will be noted that there may be some powers that will not fit
the definitions of either general or special powers. The donee may be
authorized to appoint to all except one named person. Iines v. Gain-
brill, 71 Md. 30, 13 S. E. 43 (1889). So far as an appointment to the
one named person should be concerned the power would be treated as
special. But such a power should be considered as general in determin-
ing the liability of the appointed property for the debts of the donee.
A special power may be e:elusive or non-exclusive. If the donee
may exclude objects of the power, it is exclusive; if not, it is non-
exclusive. Whether, under a non-exclusive power, each object of the
power must receive a substantial part of the property subject to the
power depends upon whether the doctrine of illusory appointments
has been accepted in that jurisdiction. Accepted in Barrett v. Barrett,
166 Ky. 411, 179 S. W. 396 (1915). Rejected in Hawthorne v. Ulrich,
207 Ill. 430, 69 N. E. 885 (1904); Bailey's Estate, 276 Pa. 147, 119 Atl.
907 (1923).
This can be avoided by making the power exercisable by deed.
In so doing the chance is taken that there may be an early appoint-
ment when there is no need for it.
FRAuD oN PowErs OF ApPOENTMENT
It is essential that the discussion be prefaced with the
statement that the courts, in the absence of statute, never order
the donee to make an appointment, never appoint for him, and
never name one to act as donee should the one named by the
donor fail to appoint. 4 The most that they will do is make an
examination of an appointment after it has been made for the
purpose of determining if it is within the scope of the power.
That appointment may be sustained, wholly or in part, or it may
be set aside.
In order to make an appointment under the power the one
named as donee must act as such, and his action as donee is
only valid when he is within the limits of his authority as to
the appointees and the method of execution of the power.
Therefore, any attempt by the donee to appoint to one to whom
an appointment has not been authorized is ineffective.5 This is
called an excessive appointment, and it fails because it is made
to a stranger to the power. It is not necessary to look beyond
the appointee. If, however, the appointment is to one of the
objects of the power on condition that the appointee convey to
some outsider, the appointment may or may not be effective.
This type of an excessive appointment O is called a fraud on the
powe(r, and it fails, if at all, because of the purpose of the
donee in making it. It is necessary to look beyond the ap-
pointee. There is an inquiry into the purpose which prompted
the appointment.
The selection of the phrase, fraud on the power, to describe
this abus e of authority is unfortunate. Actual fraud is not
nceessary, and there are many cases in which it will be absent.
Hone,st and reasonable belief as to the exact limts of the an-
thority does not escape the accusation contained in the term.
Alt tlmt is. meant i that the donee has attempted to accomplish
,owue purpose not authorized by the power, or as it has been
stated:
"The term fLaud in connection with fraud on a power does not
necessarily denote ony conduct on the part of the appointor amount-
"Where a power in trust is created by will, and the testator has
omitted to designate by whom the power is to be executed, its execu-
tion devolves on the supreme court." N. Y. Real Prop. Law (1909)
C. 51, See. 161.
,$S:gdea, Pozires (Sth ed. IS61) 49S.
"See the distinction made between fraudulent and excessive ap-
pointments in Note (1929), 42 Harv. L. Rev. 419.
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ing to fraud in the common law meaning of the term or any conduct
which could properly be termed dishonest or immoral. It merely
means that the power has been exercised for a purpose, or with an
intention, beyond the scope of or not justified by the instrument cre-
ating the power."'
Where a donor had limited the persons to whom an appoint-
ment could be made, it was evident that his intention was that
the power shoulid be exercised only for the purpose of benefiting
one or some of those persons by the gift of this propetry. This
would be true even though the donee should be authorized to
appoint to all except one named person, although it would prob-
ably be stated in the negative form; there is no intention to
benefit the one named person. If the purpose of the donor was
to be effective it was necessary that the donee should not be
permitted to accomplish some unauthorized purpose of his own.
And yet so long as he appointed to one to whom an appoint-
ment had been authorized the appointment was valid in law.8
Relief could only be had in equity, and it was natural that a
term should be applied which would state a basis of equitable
jurisdiction. The term, fraud on the power, was selected for
that reason.
PURPOSES OF THE DONOR IN CREATING A SPECIAL
POWER OF APPOINTMENT
An appointment by the donee to objects of the power can
only be a fraud on the power when it does not accord with the
purposes for which the power was created. To a great extent
a study of fraud on special powers is a search for the purposes
of the donor, and, in the majority of cases, they must be gath-
ered from the written words used in the instrument creating the
power and designating a class of persons as the beneficiaries.
Clearly, the donor intends from this that an appointment shall
be made to some member or members of the class, and for the
purpose of benefiting the appointees. Most of the cases fall
within this group. But the donor intends more than that. He
intends that the benefit passing to the appointee by reason of
the appointment shall be a benefit resulting from the gift of
the property as property. In other words, he does not intend
'Vatcher v. Paull (1916) A. C. 373, 378.
sLeake, Property in Land (2d ed. 1909) 311, Sugden, Powers (8th
ed. 1861) 606.
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that the gift of the property be used as a means of accomplish-
ing some independent purpose of the donee, even though there
be no intention to benefit an outsider.
APPOINTMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF BENEFITING
A STRANGER TO THE POWER
The most obvious cases of fraud on the power are those in
which the donee, not an object of the power, appoints to one
of the members of the class for the purpose of deriving some
personal benefit. The gain to the donee which prompts the
appointment may take a multitude of forms. It may be for
the purpose of having the appointee reconvey to the donee,9
pay the debts of the donee,' 0 pay the donee a consideration for
the appointment," or act as bail for the donee.12  The con-
sideration need not move from the appointee. A third person
may pay the donee a consideration for the appointment 13 or
do some act which is desired by the donee in return for the
appointment.' 4
Just as free from doubt are those cases in which the in-
tended beneficiary is a third person. The appointment may be
made for the purpose of having the appointee convey to an out-
ider, 15 convey to trustees in trust for cestuis, some of whom
are strangers to the power,' 6 or release some claim which the
appointee may have, the release operating to the advantage of
the non-members.' 7
DSikes v. Sikes, 163 Ga. 510, 136 S. E. 523 (1927).
" Chenoweth v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 693, 6 S. W. (2d) 1061 (1928);
Degman v. Degman, 9S Ky. 717, 34 S. W. 523 (1896); In re Cohen
(1911) 1 Ch. D. 37; Hay v. Watkins. 3 Dru. & War. 339 (Ch. 1843);
Jackson v. Jackson, Dru. 91 (Ch. 1343); Palmer v. Wheeler, 2 Ball
& B. 13 (Ch. 1811).
1 Beatson v. Bowers, 174 Ind. 601, 91 N. E. 922 (1910); Shank v.
Dewitt, 44 Ohio St. 237 (1SS6). Payment of money in consideration
of the exercise of the power to jointure is permissible. Saunders v.
Shafto (1905) Ch. D. 126.
-Bostwick v. Winton, 1 Sneed 524 (Tenn. 1853).
'-'In re Wright (1920) 1 Ch. 108.
Cochrane v. Cochrane (1922) 2 Ch. 230 (to have decree nisi of
divorce from donee made absolute); Rowley v. Rowley, Kay 242 (Ch.
1854) (to have charges on the donee's property postponed).
L In re Carroll's Estate, 275 N. Y. Supp. 911 (Surr. 1934); In re
Kirwan's Trust, 25 Ch. D. 373 (1383); Lee v. Fernie, 1 Beav. 483
(Rolls Ct. 1839); Daubney v. Cockburn, 1 Mer. 626 (Rolls Ct. 1816).
"I Pryor v. Pryor, 3 De G. J. & S. 204 (Ch. App. 13864); Birley v.
Birley, 25 Beav. 308 (Rolls Ct. 1853).
'
T Ia re Perkins (1393) 1 Ch. 283.
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In all these cases the question is whether the appointment
to an object of the power was made for the purpose of benefit-
ing a stranger to the power. This necessitates an inquiry into
the state of the mind of the donee at the time of the appoint-
ment.' s The most convincing proof of a purpose to benefit an
outsider will be found in those cases in which the act which
will be beneficial to the outsider is provided for in the appoint-
ing instrument.19 Evidence, however, which tends to show the
purpose of the donee, even though not found in the appointing
instrument, is necessarily admissable. 20 An agreement between
the donee and the appointee to the effect that the appointee will
use the property in a way beneficial to a stranger to the power,2 1
or an agreement between the donee and a third person to the
effect that the donee will appoint to an object of the power2 2
are evidence of a fraudulent purpose. The case is strengthened
where the agreement has been fully carried out, but it is not
necessarily weakened by the fact that it has not been executed
according to its exact terms.2 3
While any conveyance of the appointed property to the
donee or some third person is some evidence of an intention on
the part of the donee to appoint for the purpose of gain to him-
self or third person, it is not conclusive and may be overcome
by evidence tending to show the contrary.24
Where an appointment has been made to an object of the
power and there is nothing in the appointing instrument, nor
any agreement between the donee and the appointee to the
effect that the appointee shall use the property in a manner
beneficial to a non-member, the appointment may still be a
18 "In such a case (fraud on the power) what has to be proved is
the intention of the appointor at the time when the power was exer-
cised, which frequently necessitates evidence being given as to the
state of mind of the appointor at that date." In re Wright (1920) 1 Ch.
108, 117.
"Chenoweth v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S. W. (2d) 1061 (1928);
In re Perkins (1893) 1 Ch. 283.
"In re Wright (1920) 1 Ch. 108.
Sikes v. Sikes, 163 Ga. 510, 136 S. E. 523 (1927); Pryor v. Pryor,
3 De G. J. & S. 204 (Ch. App. 1864); Lee v. Fernie, 1 Beav. 483
(Rolls Ct. 1839); Daubney v. Cockburn, 1 Mer. 626 (Rolls Ct. 1816).
22In re Wright (1920) 1 Ch. 108.
=Ibid.
-1 Ingraham v. Meade, Fed. Cas. No. 7,045 at 55 (C. 0. E. D. Pa.
1885); Budington v. Munson, 33 Conn. 491 (1886); McQueen v. Far-
quhar, 11 Ves. Jun. 467 (Oh. 1885).
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fraud on the power. 25 The donee may have intended that the
appointee should be told by a third person that the appointee
should convey the property to some outsider, and, if so, the
appointment must fail the same as though there had been an
agreement between the donee and the appointee to that effect. 20
It is the purpose of the donee which renders the appointment a
fraud on the power, and not any agreement that may have been
made. The agreement is but evidence of the purpose, and where
the purpose is shown by other evidence the absence of the agree-
ment is of no consequence.
It is not in every case that donees have been forced to
resort to an agreement, condition, or communication by a third
person to the appointee in order to render the appointment one
for the intended benefit of some outsider. More artful appoin-
tors have been quick to take advantage of the physical condition
of an object of the power plus the state of the law as to succes-
sion of property. If an object of the power is in poor health
and the strangers to the power intended to be benefited would
succeed to the property on the death of this object, the donee
may make an appointment to that member for the purpose of
conferring a benefit on those to whom an appointment could not
be made directly.2 7 Of course he takes the chance that the
appointee may not die as soon as he expected, but there may
be a greater chance that the fraud will not be discovered since
there is little in the way of external evidence.
Whether or not the appointee was in ill health at the time
of the appointment would be of consequence in that it might
tend to show the purpose of the donee. 28 But actual ill health
would not be necessary; the mere belief of the donee that the
appointee would soon die, from any cause, would be a sufficient
peg on which to hang his intention to benefit a non-member.
Z "Perhaps the most common instance of this (fraud on the power)
Is where the exercise is due to some bargain between the appointor
and the appointee, whereby the appointor, or some other person not an
object of the power, is to derive a benefit. But such a bargain is not
essential. It is enough that the appointor's purpose and intention is to
secure a benefit for himself, or some other person not an object of the
power." Vatcher v. Paull (1915) A. C. 372, 378.
" 'In. re Marsden's Trust, 4 Drew. 594 (Ch. 1359).
""Wellesley v. Mornington, 2 K. & J. 143 (Ch. 1855).
" The fact that the appointee is an infant and dies soon after the
appointment is not sufficient proof of a fraudulent purpose. Henty v.
Wrey, 21 Ch. D. 332 (182); Beere v. Hoffmister, 23 Beav. 101 (Rolls
Ct. 1856).
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Since it is the purpose of the donee which is the significant factor
in these cases, the actual facts are not so important as the belief
of the donee with reference to those facts.
It is safe to state in view of the foregoing that nothing
more likely to produce the result desired by the donee than his
belief that the object of the power would, in the event of an
appointment to him, convey to a third person, would be a suffi-
cient base on which to rest a fraudulent purpose.29 Such cases
would be rare, but they might well arise where the donee's
belief should be based on what he assumed to be a moral obli-
gation of the appointee. Indeed, if the belief of the donee as
to the health of the object of the power is the significant factor,
rather than the actual health, no other conclusion is per-
missible.
Some doubt might be expressed as to the above case as well
as to the case where the donee should take advantage of an
agreement between an object of the power and a third person
for the conveyance of any appointed property for the purpose
of appointing to benefit the third person. It might be urged
that the appointment must have been made for the purpose of
benefit to the appointee since it must result, eithler from the
satisfaction of a willing conveyance of the property or from the
consideration given for the conveyance. This confuses two dif-
ferent matters. The deciding factor is the purpose back of the
appointment. Actual benefit to the appointee should, at most,
be no more than evidence which might tend to throw some light
on the purpose of the donee in making the appointment.
It might well be that the stranger to the power would not
receive the intended benefit. The appointee might refuse to
convey the property in a case in which the donee had told a
third person to so instruct the appointee. That the actual bene-
fit of the appointment shall result to a member or members of
the class of objects is but one part of the purpose of the donor
to be gathered from the creation of a special power. Another
and equally important part of that purpose is that the appoint-
ment shall be made with the intention of dividing that property
21 There is but little more than this in In re Marsden's Trust, 4
Drew. 594 (Ch. 1859). But see Pryor v. Pryor, 3 De G. J. & S. 204,
210 (Ch. App. 1864)! "The donee of a limited power of appointment
may well execute it in favour of an object of the power, though he be-
lieves and knows that the appointee will at oilce dispose of the prop-
erty in favour of persons who are not objects of the power."
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among the class. It is the intention of the donor that the donee
disregard the existence of persons other than the objects of the
power in making appointments, except as the existence of these
persons might be treated as circumstances to be considered in
making a division of the property among the class, as, for
example, the number of children of each object of the power.
A donee of a testamentary power may covenant with an
object of the power that he will exercise the power in favor of
that one to the extent of a certain sum of money. On principle
it would seem that any appointment pursuant to the covenant
Would be open to the objection that it might have been prompted
by a desire to save the donee's estate from any possible loss for
breach of the covenant. Whether or not the covenant would be
valid so as to support an action for damages would not neces-
sarily determine whether the donee had appointed in accordance
with the covenant for the purpose of relieving his estate of lia-
bility. He might think that a breach of the covenant would
give rise to an action for damages.
However, if the covenant is valid so as to give rise to an
action for the breach thereof, then the donee must have been
under a duty to appoint as he had agreed. To hold that a per-
formance of that duty would be a fraud on the power would be
placing the donee in the position of almost, inability to perform.
If he appointed as he agreed the appointment would be set aside
as a fraud on the power. About the only possible means by
which he could avoid an action for damages would be to let the
property pass in default of appointment, and that would not
help where he should have covenanted to appoint more than
each object would receive in default of an appointment. One is
forced to conclude that, if an action for damages may be main-
tained for breach, of the covenant, an appointment pursuant to
the covenant cannot be a fraud on the power, even though the
donee did so appoint to relieve his estate of liability.
Stuart v. Lord Castlestuart3 0 was the first case in which
this problem was presented. In that case the donee had a
power to appoint property by deed or will among his children.
He became surety on a debt of one son, and by his will he
appointed an amount equal to the debt to that son on condition
that the appointee pay the debt. The court dismissed the con-
-08 Ir. Ch. R. 408 (1858).
K. L. J.-2
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tention that the donee might have appointed for the purpose
of benefiting some one other than the appointee by stating that:
"In the cases which have been cited, some benefit was derived by
the donee of the power, so as to constitute fraud. The decision of the
Master has carried the principle further than any case that I am
aware of, there being no ground whatever for imputing to the testator
that he executed the power with any fraudulent or improper motive,
or with a view to any benefit to himself."'n
This language would seem to indicate that the court was
under the impression that any intention to benefit those who
would succeed to the property of the donee on his death would
not be a fraud on the power. Certainly, one cannot escape from
the feeling that the very purpose of the appointment of this
sum to the appointee was to relieve the estate of the donee of
any possible liability.3 2  It is no answer to state there was no
intention to derive a personal gain.
Yet it is possible that the result of the Stuart case is the
one that could and should have been reached on another ground.
The objects of the power were the children of the donee. For
aught that appears they were the only ones who would be bene-
fited by any saving of the estate of the donee. To the extent
that they were the only ones who would gain by reason of the
removal of any liability of the estate the result may be right.
There might not then be any intention to benefit strangers to
the power since the objects of the power are the beneficiaries
of the estate of the donee as well as the property subject to
the power.33
In Coffin v. Cooper3 4 the donee had a testamentary power
to appoint property among her children. She covenanted with
one son and a third person that she would exercise the power
in favor of the son to the extent of £1,000. She did so appoint
and the court sustained the appointment.
The reason given for the decision was the rule permitting
the release of such a power by the donee, plus the decision in
'I.. at 419.
12This is supported by the following extract from the opinion:
"The object, however, of the testator in this case, was not to obtain
any benefit for himself as the will would not take effect until his death.
His object was to prevent the injustice to his other children of having
that which was not the testator's own debt paid out of his general
property."--fl. at 418.
1Vatcher v. Paull (1915) A. C. 373.
2 Drew & Sm. 365 (Ch. 1865).
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the case of Davies v. THguenin35 to the effect that a covenant
not to exercise a power so as to diminish the amount which an
object would receive in default of appointment constituted a
release of the power.
The conclusion that a covenant to appoint a certain sum
mu.t be treated in the same way as a covenant not to appoint
so as to diminish the share which an object would receive in
default of appointment appears to be perfectly sound. Yet
there is a difference which, so far as the cases are concerned,
i-s substantial. It is the difference between an appointment and
a default of appointment.
Under the English law the donee of a testamentary power
may exercise the discretion given to him as to the shares of
the objects of the power prior to the time when he could make
an appointment by releasing the power. 36 But a release means
that the power is extinguished and that the property must pass
in default of appointment. And though there may be a release
a,, to one object of the power, to hold that a covenant to appoint
any amount is a release of the power is to lose sight of the
fact that a release should never be permitted to give an object
of the power more than he would receive in default of appoint-
raent.3 7 Therefore, if the donee in the Coffin case covenanted
to appoint more to the son than he would have received in de-
fault of appointment, the covenant should not have been treated
as a release of the power. This would leave but two grounds
on which to support the result of the case. One is that mentioned
in connection with the ,Stuart case and the other is that a breach
of the covenant would support an action for damages.
The facts of the case of Palmer v. Locke38s are similar to the
facts in the Coffin case. The donee of a power to appoint
property among his children, made a will appointing a cer-
tain sum to one son, and he later executed a bond to that son
that he would, out of the property over which he had the power
of appointment or his property, leave that son the amount which
he had already appointed to him in his will. He did appoint
this sum to the son. In sustaining the appointment, the court
di'cussed the question of the liability of the estate of the donee
S1 Hem. & i. 730 (Ch. 1863).
,'Lawv of Property Act, 15 Geo. V, c. 20, Sec. 155 (1925).
'In re Cooke (1922) 1 Ch. 292; In re Evered (1910) 2 Ch. 147.
S15 Ch. D. 294 (1880),
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for breach of the promise to appoint a certain sum, but refused
to decide the case on that ground. 9 Once more it might be
possible to sustain the result of the case on the ground that the
objects of the power were the only ones who would have gained
through any saving of the estate of the donee.
It has been stated that "to hold such appointments bad as
a device would be to strain the doctrine as to improper appoint-
ments too far." 40 It is possible that that statement may have
resulted from the belief that to hold that there could be fraud
in these cases Would mean that every appointment would have
to be set aside. But the mere possibility of fraud does not mean
that it is present. It still must be found that the donee did
appoint for the purpose of relieving his estate of liability so
that strangers to the power might be benefited thereby. This
improper purpose will not be present in those cases in which
the objects of the power are the only persons who would benefit
from any saving of the estate of the donee.
The net result of the English authorities is that an appoint-
ment which may have been made for the purpose of benefiting
some stranger to the power is not a fraud on the power if that
appointment is in accordance with a covenant made with, the
appointee to so appoint. None of the reasons which are ad-
vanced in favor of this result should lead the American courts
to hold that there can be no fraud as a matter of law.
It is submitted that a covenant to appoint to an object of
the power should not be held to give rise to an action for dam-
ages for breach thereof so long as the power is testamentary.
The effect would be to permit an appointment by deed, and,
where the property subject to the power should be a sum of
money, an award of damages would, in effect, be the same as a
decree of specific performance. This would mean that the
donee could effectively exercise a discretion that should have
been retained to the time of his death.
Moreover, the object of the power has no just cause for
complaint since he is claiming under the power and against the
"For a later decision to the effect that there can be no action for
damages for breach of the covenant see In re Bradshaw (1902) 1 Ch.
43&
" Lord Hatherly, L. C., in Bulteel v. Plummer, L. R. 6 Ch. App.
160, 163 (1870). Referred to with approval by James, Brett, and
Cotton, L. JJ., in Palmer v. Locke, 15 Ch. D. 294 (1870) at 299, 301, and
304 respectively.
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donee as donee. To him it should be said that the donee cov-
enanted to exercise a discretion once and for all when the donor
intended it should remain open to him to the time of his death.
The donee and the object of the power should be required to
observe this intention of the donor.41
This, plus the fact that the American courts have never
gone to the extent of the English courts in holding cove-
nants to exercise or not exercise a power to be a release,42
should lead the former to take the position that an appointment
in accordance with a covenant made with the appointee to so
appoint may be a fraud on the power. This would still leave
open in each case the question as to whether the donee had,
in fact, appointed for the purpose of benefiting a stranger to
the power.
APPOINTMENTS MTADE FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTROLLING THE
FUTURE CONDUCT OF OBJECTS OF THE POWER
'Where the appointor is not restricted as to appointees, ex-
cept as by the method of appointment, the power is general and
is said to be for the benefit of the donee.43 Beginning with a
restriction of one person and adding a few at a time,4 4 a point
is eventually reached where it can be definitely ascertained that
the power is for the benefit of those to whom appointments can be
made.4 5 The line between the two is more or less arbitrary, and
more is not now said than that it is reached in those cases in
which the power is to appoint among a class such as children,
heirs, or next of kin.
'When it is stated that a general power is for the benefit
of the donee, what is meant is that the power is given to the
donee so that he may have such satisfaction as is to be derived
from the disposition of the property. The -donor intends to
,"It is on this ground that a deed power is to be distinguished.
The donee of a deed power who covenants to exercise that power in
favor of an object of the power is exercising a discretion which the
donor intended might be finally exercised at any time. He could ap-
point at the time when the covenant is made.
See Sines, Powers in Trust and the Termination of Powers by
the Donee (1927) 37 Yale L. J. 63, 211; Gray, Release and Discharge of
Powers (1911) 24 Harv. L. Rev. 511.
"Kales, Estates Future Interest (2d ed. 1920) Sec. 611.
"1 Many interesting problems are suggested by a power to appoint
to anyone by the name of Smith.
'5Special is used here to mean that kind of a power, unless other-
wise indicated.
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confer on the donee all the attributes of ownership insofar as
the conveyance of the property is concerned. Therefore, it is
to be concluded from the mere creation of the power that the
donor intended the discretion of the donee as to appointees to
be as broad as the discretion of an owner. In order to render
the discretion of the donee any less than that of an owner there
must be something in the instrument creating the power indicat-
ing such intention on the part of the donor.
The donee of a special power, one given for the benefit of
the objects of the power, starts with a much more limited au-
thority. Without some contrary intention, it is reasonable to
conclude that there is, in addition to the intention that appoint-
ments shall be made for the purpose of benefiting the objects
of the power, an intention that the appointments shall be made
for the purpose of benefiting the appointees by a gift of the
property as property;40 that the gift of the property to an
object of the power shall not be used for the purpose of con-
trolling the future conduct of the appointee. Without a con-
trary intention, the donee's authority extends only to a selec-
tion of the appointees and the quantum of property that those
appointees shall have. If the donor intends that the authority
of the donee should be any broader, the burden is on him to
use words showing such an intention.
In support of this position is the case of D'Abbadie v.
Bizoim.47  The donee was given a power to appoint among her
children in such shares as she should choose. She directed that
part of the property subject to the power be sold and the pro-
ceeds be used to purchase other property in France which should
belong to one of the objects of the power if he should decide to re-
side in France. In holding the appointment invalid, it is stated
that the purpose of the appointment was to induce the appointee
to reside in France and that this is ". . . an indirect object not
warranted by the power.''48 Obviously one cannot, in the face
1' "A party having a power like this (special power of appoint-
ment) must fairly and honestly execute it without having any ulterior
object to be accomplished. He cannot carry into execution any indirect
object, or acquire any benefit for himself, directly or indirectly. It
may be subject to limitations and directions, but it must be a pure,
straightforward, honest dedication of the property as property, to the
person to whom he affects, or attempts, to give it in character." Lord
St. Leonards in Portland v. Topham, 11 H. L. Cas. 32, 55-56 (1864).
7 5 Ir. R. Eq. 205 (1871).
IId. at 213.
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of the condition, contend that the purpose of the donee was to
make a gift of the property as such. From the language used
in the appointing instrument the donee intended to use the ap-
pointment as a means of controlling the future residence of the
appointee, a matter clearly not within the scope of the power.
To the contrary is the case of Hodgson v. Halford.49  The
power given to the donee was similar to the power created in
the D'Abbadie case. The appointments were on condition that
should any of the appointees cease to profess the Jewish re-
ligion, or marry anyone not born a Jew, the share of that child
was to be forfeited. The appointment was sustained, and in
answer to the contention that the appointment was not author-
ized by the terms of the power, it is stated that:
"In the absence of any authority to the contrary, I think that a
power such as this given to a parent to appoint amongst his children
ought not to receive a limited or narrow construction, but ought rather
to be construed so as to embrace every ordinary provision which a
parent might make, and which might be useful or available for the
children amongst whom and in whose favor the power is to be
exercised.",'
While there is much truth in the claim that a power to ap-
point among one's children may be given for the purpose of
controlling the conduct of the children up to the time of the ap-
pointment through the threat of reducing shares and excluding
objects,5i the statement just quoted from the Hodgson case goes
far beyond that, and is erroneous in that it permits the donee
to control the conduct of the objects of the power beyond the
tiwe when an effective appointment could last be made.
Just as clearly as in the D'Abbadie case, the purpose of the
donee in the Hodgson case was to control the conduct of the
appointees by aeans of the appointment beyond the time within
which the power must have been exercised, if at all. There is
no ground for distinguishing the conditions in the two cases.
The fact that one was precedent and the other subsequent is
S11 Ch. D. 959 (1S79).
1I1d. at 966.
" "The end and purpose of the power is the benefit of the chil-
dren; and it appears to me to be a principle that the donee in the
exercise of the power should have that object alone in view. Of course
I do not exclude the consideration that the donor may have also in-
tended to keep the children under the parents' control where a parent
is a donee of the power." Kindersley, V. C., in Coffin v. Cooper, 2
Drew. & Sm. 365, 373-374 (Ch. 1S65).
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immaterial. The two cases are in conflict, and every consider-
ation points to the D'Abbadie case as having reached the cor-
rect result.
An appointment may be made on condition that the ap-
pointee pay a debt which he owes to a third person.52 Of course
there is always the possibility that such an appointment may
have been made for the purpose of benefiting the creditor. Aside
from that, the condition would render the appointment a fraud
on the power in that it shows a purpose on the part of the donee
to control the use to be made of the appointed property, a mat-
ter also not within the scope of the power.53 The same would
be true of an appointment on condition that the appointee pur-
chase certain property. The fact that the appointee could per-
form with other money or property does not alter the result.
It still remains that the appointor's purpose is not to benefit
the appointee by the gift of the property, but by the gift of the
property plus the manner in which the property or its equivalent
shall be used.
The intention to use an appointment for the purpose of
controlling the conduct of the appointee beyond the life of the
power could as well be found in the case in which the appointor
should make use of an agreement with the appointee rather than
a condition in the appointing instrument. In return for the
promise of the object of the power to live in a certain place, the
appointment might be made for the purpose of securing per-
formance of the promise. An appointment under such, condi-
tions should be treated in exactly the same manner as an ap-
pointment on condition that the appointee live in a certain place.
It may be thought that an inquiry into the purpose of the
donee is unnecessary since the donee is or is not authorized to
make conditional appointments; and if he is authorized to make
6'The appointing instrument in Stuart v. Lord Castlestuart, 8 Ir.
Ch. R. 408 (1858), contained such a condition. In Coffin v. Cooper, 2
Drew. & Sm. 365 (Ch. 1865), the appointing instrument directed
that the sum appointed should be paid to the creditor of the appointee.
"The donee of a special power may appoint the real property
which is subject to the power to one object with a charge in favor of
other objects. Darling v. Edson, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 498 (1897). Unless
there is something to indicate that the donor intended the specific
property to be appointed, the donee of a special power may direct that
the property be sold and the proceeds divided among the objects of
the power. McNeile's Estate, 217 Pa. 179, 66 Atl. 328 (1907). But in
both cases the particular appointments are made for the purpose of
distributing the property among the objects of the power.
FRAuD ON PowERs OF APPOINTMENT
conditional appointments, it makes no difference whlether or
not the appointee has any control over the condition-a power
to appoint conditionally authorizes the appointments on any
conditions that an owner might make in the disposition of his
property. If the donee is only authorized to appoint on certain
conditions, it necessarily follows that he cannot appoint on any
other condition.
As a practical matter it may make little difference whether
the appointment is called excessive or fraudulent, and it must
be conceded that there is much merit in the contention that the
entire problem of conditional appointments could be treated as
a matter of excessve appointments. But to the extent that a
conditional appointment may show a desire on the part of the
donee to accomplish some purpose not authorized by the donor,
it may also be treated as a matter of fraud on the power. This
latter method of approach is in accord with that pursued in
those cases in which the appointment was made on condition
that the appointee do some act intended to benefit a stranger to
the power.54
APPOINTMENTS PROMPTED BY THE LiKEs AND
DIsLn s OF THE DONEE
It has been stated that, "The mere motive of an appoint-
ment apart from the purpose to be effected by it, as the indul-
gence of feelings of preference or animosity towards the ob-
jects, is immaterial to the validity."5 All that is meant by
that is that the donee may prefer one object to another for any
reason so long as there is no intention to benefit an outsider or
control the conduct of the appointees beyond the life of the
power. There is nothing startling in such a proposition. The
donor only intended such persons to take and such shares as
the donee, in his discretion, should determine. Unless otherwise
restricting the donee by the instrument creating the power, the
donor must have intended that the appointor be as free in the
disposition of this property among this group, so long as his
only consideratoin was the division of the property as such
among them, as the donor would have been. Doubtless the
donor hoped that the donee would appoint only after due con-
'Chenoweth v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S. W. (2d) 1061 (1928);
In re Perkins (1893) 1 Ch. 283.
1' Leake, Property in Land (2d ed. 1909) 312.
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sideration of the needs and merits of each object of the power,
but it would be need and merit as determined by the donee.
Personal feelings will invariably find their way into such per-
sonal determination, and to make that a ground for attacking
the appointment is to render it impossible for the donor to
obtain the very thing he desired-the discretion of the donee. 0
It is one thing to make an appointment of all of the prop-
erty to one or some of the objects of the power because of the
conduct of those excluded. So long as the power is exclusive
that is a matter within the discretion of the donee. It is an
altogether different thing to make an appointment covering all
of the property, but which the donee and the appointee secretly
agree is to apply to only one half of the property, for the pur-
pose of controlling private affairs of the other objects of the
power. This is just as clearly not within the scope of the power.
A donee is never permitted to feign an appointment for the
purpose of inducing certain action on the part of an object of
the power.
In substance this is the principle to be gathered from the
case of Portland v. Topham.57 In that case there were two ob-
jects of the power, and the income from the property was to
be paid to them as tenants in common pending an appointment.
The donee appointed all the income to one for the purpose of
inducing the one excluded to separate from her husband. The
appointee was never told that she was entitled to all the income,
and she paid over one half to be held at the disposal of the
donee. It is a clear case of a pretended appointment to one
object of the power for the purpose of controlling the future
conduct of other objects.
VALIDITY OF THE APPOINT=IENTG8
Whether an appointment to an object of the power is or is
not invalid because of the fact that it Ias been made for a
O "In cases where it is not suggested that the donee of a special
power has exercised the power with the intention of benefiting him-
self or some other person not an object of the power the Court will
not as a rule examine into the motive which may have induced the
donee to exercise the power in favour of a particular object of the
power. The donee is entitled to prefer one object to another from any
motive he pleases, and however capriciously he exercises the power
the Court will uphold it." In re Wright (1920) 1 Ch. 108, 117-118.
r, 11 H. L. Cas. 32 (1864).
r4A court will not permit the intended benefit to the stranger to
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purpose beyond the scope of the power must depend upon the
intention of the donee. If there is nothing in the appointing
instrument to indicate that the appointor intended the appoint-
ment to the object of the power to be effective, even though the
improper purpose desired by the appointment could not be, then
the appointment fails.5 9 If, however, there is an intention that
the appointee shall take the property appointed irrespective of
the intended benefit to the stranger to the power, or the attempt
to control the future conduct of the appointee, the appointment
is valid.
A donee may, in one instrument make two appointments, the
second to be effective if the first cannot be. That the first may
have been prompted by a desire to accomplish a purpose not
warranted by the power is no reason for refusing to give effect
to the second if it is within the scope of the authority. Where
the donee foresees the possibility and pursues this course the
task is a simple one.
In those eases in which there is no expressed intention one
way or the other, there is the question as to whether this in-
tention may not be found in the circumstances surrounding the
appointment. Thus, in the event of an appointment of $1,000
to an object of the power on condition that he pay $500 to a
stranger to the power, it may be felt that there is an intention
to benefit the appointee to the extent of $500 since that is the
.um which the appointee would have for himself after paying
the $500 to the outsider.
Aithough the appointee would profit if the donee's intention
hould be carried out, it cannot be said that there is any in-
tention to benefit the appointee aside from the intended benefit
to the out'ider.0" It may well have been that the donee ap-
pointed the additional $i;500 to the appointee as an inducement
for the performance of the condition.
The problem is of the same nature in those cases in which
the appointment is made for the purpose of controlling the fu-
the power to take efect. Where, however, seasonable objection is not
made, the outsider may receive the benefit of the appointment. See
Bostielz v. Winton, 1 Sneed 524 (Tenn. 1253); Cochrane v. Cochrane
(!922) 2 Ch. 230.
-Chenoweth v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S. W. (2d) 1061 (1928);
Vatcher v. Paull (1915) A. C. 373.
"In re Carroll's Estate, 275 N. Y. Supp. 911 (Surr. 1934); Daubney
v. Cvekburn, 1 Mer. 626 (Rolls Ct. 1816).
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ture conduct of the appointee. Is it possible to find a separate
intention to benefit the appointee, or is it so tied up with the
improper purpose that there can be no separation? Certainly
an appointment to a member of the class on condition that he
reside in a certain place or profess a certain religion does not
contain any facts which might show an intention to benefit the
appointee by a gift of the property as such and independent of
any intention to control the future conduct of the appointee.0 1
An appointment on condition that the appointee pay a debt
he owes or purchase certain property, assuming that it is not
made for the purpose of benefiting a stranger to the power,
differs from the other situations in that it calls for a single act
on the part of the donee and is designed to benefit the appointee
through an exchange of the property appointed for the debt
that is owed or other property. These facts would seem to in-
dicate an intention on the part of the donee that the appoint-
ment should be effective apart from the condition. 2 The ap-
pointment partakes much of the nature of benefit to the ap-
pointee and little of the nature of control over the conduct of
the appointee.
The appointing instrument may contain appointments to
several of the objects of the power with a condition annexed
to one requiring that appointee to pay a certain sum to a strang-
er to the power. The Ohio Coirt,63 when confronted with this
problem, held that all the appointments failed on the ground
that those who were given smaller shares might have received
more but for the fraud on the power in connection with the one
appointment.
That the donee might have appointed more to some of the
objects but for his desire to confer a benefit on a stranger to
the power is beside the point. It still remains that he did
intend the appointees on whom he imposed no conditions to re-
ceive the amounts appointed to each, unless there is something
to indicate that he intended each appointment to be conditional
upon the effectiveness of every other appointment. 'Where there
is no express intention in the appointing instrument there is
about as much reason for reaching one conclusion as the other.
Since an appointment is a fraud on the power because it is
1D'Abbadie v. Bizoin, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 205 (1871).
12 Coffin v. Cooper, 2 Drew. & Sm. 365 (Ch. 1865).
0 Shank v. Dewitt, 44 Ohio St. 237 (1886).
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contrary to the purposes for which the donor created the power,
it necessarily follows that later appointments to other objects
for the purpose of equalizing the shares cannot cure the fraud-
ulent appointment.6 4 Equally without effect in determining the
validity of the appointment is the fact that the appointee may
consent to the act which the donee attempts to impose upon him
for the benefit of the outsider6O
PuRCHAsER FROM TE APPoINTEE
The cases state that an appointment made for a purpose
foreign to the power is void.6 The Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky, after cautioning itself with regard to the use of loose
language, concluded that the use of the word void is ". . . an
accurate expression designating the result of an attempt to per-
form an act which the performer has no authority to per-
form. ",
6 7
Opposed to this is the conclusion of Farwell, L. J., stated
in the case of (loutte v. Storeyos as follows:
"The law may be stated thus: An appointment under a common
law power, or a power operating under the Statute of Uses by which
the legal estate has passed is voidable only, and a purchaser for value
with the legal estate and without notice is not affected by the fraud-
ulent execution of the power; but an appointment in fraud of an
equitable power, i. e., not operating so as to pass the legal estate orinterest is void, and a purchaser for value without notice but without
the legal title can only rely on such equitable defenses as are open to
purchasers without the legal title who are subsequent in time against
prior equitable title."'*
That the conclusion of Farwell is sound would appear from
the following analysis: So long as the appointment is to an
"Harrison v. Randall, 9 Hare 397 (Ch. 1852).
cChenoweth v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S. W. (2d) 1061 (1928).
In none of the cases is the appointment said to be voidable.
Chenoweth v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 724, 6 S. W. (2d) 1061, 1072(1928). In that case property was left to A and his wife, B, during
their lives, and the life of the survivor, and then to such of the donor'slineal heirs as A should devise by will. A devised to one of the donor's
lineal heirs on condition that he pay A's debts and also pay B an
annual sum. B survived. After B's death suit was brought by the
heirs of the donor for a sale of the property and division of the pro-
ceeds. One defense was the statute of limitations applicable in cases
of fraud. The court avoided consideration of this defense by treating
the appointment as void, since the statute of limitations would only
be applicable if the proceedings were to avoid the appointment. No
reason, aside from the fact that the cases say the appointment is void,
was given for the holding in this case.
69 (1911) 1 Ch. 18.
01Id. at 3L
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object of the power and is executed in the manner provided by
the donor, the appointing instrument operates to convey the
interest in the property which is subject to the power of ap-
pointment. 'Where that interest is the legal estate, no further
conveyance is necessary and a purchaser for value and without
notice from the appointee would get the legal title, and so take
free and clear of the equities of the other objects of the power.7 0
*Where the interest subject to the power is equitable, an appoint-
ment could only pass an equitable interest, which is all that a
purchaser could get from his vendor. Having only an equity
in that case which would necessarily be subsequent in time to
the equities of the other objects of the power, the purchaser
would not be protected.71
The question then arises as to whether one could ever be
a purchaser without notice if the appointing instrument con-
tains the condition, agreement, or other facts which reason-
ably indicate the purpose of the donee which is foreign to the
power. The appointing instrument is a direct link in the chain
of title of the purchaser. Purchasers are held to knowledge of
the essential contents of instruments in their chain of title, re-
gardless of the fact that the instruments may not be of record."
The question, then, must be answered in the negative. So, as
a practical matter, the correct result is reached when it is said
that fraud on the power renders the appointment void, if the
appointing instrument gives reasonable notice of the facts which
render the appointment fraudulent.
LATER EXERCISE OF THE POWE
Given a case in which the power is exercisable by deed, the
fact that an appointment by deed has been set aside as a fraud
on the power does not prevent a later exercise of the power.73
"The bona fide purchaser from the appointee is protected in Eng-
land by statute to the extent that the property is equal in value or
amount to that to which the appointee was presumptively entitled in
default of appointment at the time of the appointment, provided that
the appointee was at least twenty-five years of age. Law of Property
Act, 15 Geo. 7, c. 20, Sec. 157 (1925).
Cloutte v. Storey (1911) 1 Oh. 181.
7 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) See. 572.
' After setting aside an appointment in Portland v. Topham, 11
H. L. Cas. 32 (1864), a later appointment was examined in Topham
v. Portland, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 40 (1869). In Cochrane v. Cochrane,
(1922) 2 Ch. 230, an appointment was set aside as a fraud on the
power and it was assumed that the donee might later exercise the
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The improper purpose of the donee affects the appointment
only and not the power or the position held by the donee.
Even though the donee is still free to exercise the power, a
second appointment to the same appointee as the one which has
been set aside as a fraud on the power, not under any new
arrangement between the donee and the appointee, might still
be fraudulent because of the original purpose. The fact that
the first appointment to this appointee was fraudulent is rele-
vant evidence in determining the purpose of the donee in the
second appointment. The weight to be given to such evidence
should depend upon the circumstances, such as a comparison
between the amounts appointed in each case and the time that
has elapsed between the two appointments.
A second appointment of the same amount to the same ap-
pointee was set aside in the case of Topharn v. Duike of Port-
la2d7.74 The court stated that ". . . a second appointment by
the same donee to the same appointee cannot be sustained other-
wise than by clear proof on the part of the appointee that the
second appointment is perfectly free from the original taint
which attached to the first. '75 This means that the prior fraud-
ulent appointment gives rise to a presumption that the purpose
remains in the second appointment. It is doubtful if that
should be extended beyond the case in which the second ap-
pointment is of the same amount as the first and follows within
a reasonably close period of time.
power. "I note Sir Ernest's offer to ensure the plaintiff (the first ap-
pointee) should take a share equal to that of his other children, and I
hope that he will take steps to give effect to that offer; but the matter
is not one as to which I ought to put him on any terms." Id. at 254,
255.
74L. R. 5 Ch. App. 40 (1869).
SId. at 62.
